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i
Abstract
This study explores the moral content evident in speeches by 2020 US
Presidential Candidates Joe Biden and Donald Trump. Drawing on Moral Foundations
Theory (Haidt, 2013), I test the hypotheses that each candidate’s moral content, as
measured by the use of certain morally salient keywords, will fall along patterns based on
their political affiliation. In testing these hypotheses, I also present a comparison of
keyword analysis methods. The first uses a simple word count procedure alongside the
Moral Foundations Dictionary 2.0, developed by Frimer et al. (2017), which scores a
document based on the presence of words from each of the moral foundations. This
method is a direct offshoot of Moral Foundations Theory, with earlier iterations having
been used in development of the theory (Graham et al., 2009). The second method uses
the extended Moral Foundations Dictionary developed by Hopp et al. (2020), which
scores documents based on the moral scores of words derived from a crowd-sourced
development project.
Results indicate some departures from the predicted model, but more striking is
the finding that there appears to be little significant difference between the two
candidates’ overall pattern of moral keyword use. However, this pattern is not consistent
across both methods of analysis. Thus, I also present a comparison of these methods and
comment on underlying differences in operationalization that call into question whether
they are truly measuring the same thing.
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1
Introduction
When Joseph Biden announced his campaign for the Democratic presidential
nomination, he claimed that the 2020 election represented “a battle for the soul of the
nation” (Joe Biden, 2019). This became his campaign slogan, a veritable battle cry to
rally voters against sitting president Donald Trump, whom Biden claimed had “long ago
forfeited any moral leadership in this country” (Biden, 2020). Despite the possibly
confrontational tone inherent in a message about battle, Biden’s campaign emphasized
the importance of unity among all Americans regardless of differences in political
ideology. However, Biden only won the election with approximately 51% of all votes
cast (“Fact check”, 2020). It appears that his appeal for unity was not enough to win over
voters who may have already decided to vote for other candidates.
The explanation for Biden’s narrow victory may be as simple as voters forming
their opinions and casting their ballots along party lines despite the potential merits of an
opposing candidate. But what other factors may have been involved? Research linking
politics and moral psychology suggests that liberals and conservatives often use different
language to discuss the same topics, thus appealing to different moral foundations to
make their cases (e.g., Feinberg & Willer, 2015; Haidt, 2013; Lakoff, 1996). Perhaps
Biden’s messages were couched in inherently “liberal” or “democratic” language that
dissuaded conservative voters? In the current study, I explore this possibility by using
two methods of moral content analysis to discover whether Biden’s and Trump’s
language contains partisan based moral content in patterns predicted by Moral
Foundations Theory. Results indicate more apparent similarities than differences between
the candidates, although the two measures do not agree on the overall patterns of moral
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language, likely as a result of distinct differences in the underlying definition and
measurement of moral content.
It seems plausible that Biden’s criticism of Donald Trump’s “moral forfeiture”
was based, at least in part, on Trump’s divisive reputation. During his presidency, Trump
established a penchant for incivility directed towards political opponents, both public and
private figures alike (Baker, 2017; Stohr, 2017). For example, Trump denounced players
in the National Football League who knelt during the national anthem in protest of racial
inequality, claiming that these players were unpatriotic and should be banned from the
league (Belson & Davis, 2017). He derided his own staff for making choices that did not
advance his interests, such as his Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who recused himself
from an investigation into links between Trump and the Russian government (Gstalter,
2019). Trump mocked the parents of a fallen US soldier who spoke against him during
the 2016 Democratic National Convention (“Fury…”, 2016). He once claimed that his
fame and fortune allowed him to sexually assault women (Taylor, 2016), a comment that
he waved aside as “locker room talk” during the 2016 debates with candidate Hillary
Clinton (Diaz, 2016). These are but a few examples of Trump’s style of rhetoric,
described by one media reporter as strategy based on the idea that there are “so many
people to attack, so little time” (Wehner, quoted in Baker, 2017).
Trump’s contemptuous rhetoric became a regular pattern, enabling similar
attitudes and behaviors in his supporters (Stohr, 2017). During the Trump presidency,
latent right-wing extremism surfaced, emboldened by a president who fails to condemn
those who support his own causes yet threaten our nation’s democratic institutions
(Rakich, 2021). The most troubling example of this occurred on January 6, 2021. While

3
Congress was convened to officially count the electoral votes and certify the results of the
2020 election, President Trump led a rally in which he outlined the ways he felt the
election had been “stolen” from him. He encouraged his supporters to march to the US
Capitol in demonstration of support for those members of Congress that might uphold a
Trump victory (Naylor, 2021). A large group of supporters did march, and in fact laid
siege to the US Capitol Building, causing congress to evacuate or shelter behind locked
doors for their safety.
Of course, political strife during the years of Trump’s presidency was not the sole
fault of his supporters. Left-wing activists, notably the group ANTIFA (i.e. Anti-Fascist),
exhibited similar displays of militancy, often in direct physical conflict with right-wing
activists. Racial tensions were high throughout 2020, when the death of George Floyd, an
unarmed Black man, at the hands of policy officers sparked months-long demonstrations
worldwide. Many of these demonstrations turned violent, as some left-wing agitators
used the protests as opportunities to protest against police officers and promote some
form of anarchistic ideology.
Research suggests that we are living in an increasingly polarized political climate
driven by the moralization of politics (e.g. Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2013; Skitka &
Morgan, 2014). Skitka and Morgan (2014) contrasted the ways in which previous
generations viewed partisan policy differences as based on group preferences or opinions,
whereas individuals in the current political moment are more likely to perceive policy
issues as universal moral imperatives. Their work indicates that individuals are less likely
to adopt flexible positions regarding political issues, and more likely to take extreme
actions to advance their political views.
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If there is indeed a widening moral divide in politics, how exactly do the two
major parties fall along this divide? Are there predictable patterns for liberal and
conservative morality, and if so, do Biden and Trump align with these patterns? This
study explores these questions, and I turn now to a review of two prominent theories of
political morality.

5
Literature Review
Morality and Politics
Cognitive linguist George Lakoff was perhaps the first to propose a model that
describes the differences between liberal and conservative conceptualizations of morality.
Lakoff (1996) described several observations about the ways in which liberals and
conservatives approach political issues. For example, liberals and conservatives often
support predictable “sets” of ideals. The liberal “set” frequently includes things like
reduced military spending, support for reproductive rights (including, but not limited to,
abortion), and support for environmental issues. On the other hand, conservatives often
support low tax rates, increased spending on military, and strict criminal justice laws.
Lakoff (1996) observed that politicians, and perhaps the public as a whole, often frame
opposing viewpoints as immoral, that is, against some universally understood concept of
what is right or good. As a cognitive linguist, Lakoff was interested in the differences in
which liberals and conservatives talk about these moral issues, thus he developed a model
of political morality, first discussed in Lakoff (1996).
Prior to developing his model of political morality, Lakoff was known for
advancing Conceptual Metaphor Theory alongside Mark Johnson (Lakoff & Johnson,
1980). Broadly, this theory focuses on the ways in which people experience and describe
abstract concepts in terms of concrete experiences, and how linguistic metaphors reveal
these underlying concepts. For example, someone may refer to the abstract notion of
understanding using the concrete experience of seeing, exemplified by metaphorical
phrases such as ‘I see what you mean,’ or ‘My eyes have been opened to the truth.’
Following this line of reasoning, Lakoff (1996) proposed that liberals and conservatives
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have distinctly different underlying conceptualizations of morals in politics. He drew on
research that demonstrates a common conceptual metaphor of the United States as a
family, with governmental entities and politicians taking parental roles. Lakoff (1996)
proposed that the prototypical liberal understanding of this family is one led by a
nurturant parent, while the prototypical conservative understanding is a family led by a
strict parent, specifically a strict father. This informs how individuals understand political
issues and evaluate their moral worth.
Under a pure nurturant parent moral concept, individuals conceptualize a family
in which children are inherently good, and the role of parents is to exhibit care towards
them and help them develop into mature adults. These adults then care for other people
and other aspects of society, such as the environment. Nurturant parent morality follows
metaphorical concepts that depict morality as empathy, nurturance, and fair distribution.
In contrast, the strict father moral concept is based less on care and more on justice, or
the idea that people should receive what they deserve based on their own initiative and
action. In this family concept, children are not necessarily inherently good; they must
learn good from bad and right from wrong through a just system of rewards and
punishments. Strict father morality follows metaphorical concepts that depict morality as
purity, health, and self reliance.
As an example of one conflict inherent between these moral concepts, Lakoff
(1996) described the state of modern-day capitalism. Conservatives may point to free
market capitalism to demonstrate the benefits of a just worldview. In this system,
theoretically anyone can achieve wealth commensurate to the effort they put in towards
this achievement. Competition in the free market begets innovation, and those who
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innovate receive financial reward. Conversely, liberals may point out that this system
creates a wealth gap that leaves many people behind the financial curve of elites. Those
who are impoverished may not deserve their situation simply because they do not have
access to the resources necessary to build wealth. Thus, the government should care for
these individuals by eliminating wealth inequality in some way.
Lakoff (1996) acknowledged that his model was just that: a model, rather than a
fully elaborated theory. However, he believed that these family based moral evaluations
would be evident in the language used to discuss issues from either a liberal or
conservative viewpoint. Researchers have since used the family model to explore the
moral content of political documents, speeches, and the like, as well as to test
relationships between political affiliation and family conceptualizations. Cienki (2005)
analyzed debates between Republican candidate George W. Bush and Democratic
candidate Al Gore during the 2000 US Presidential election. He found that each candidate
did use speech that would indicate entailments of their predicted family models, but at
times both candidates appeared to draw from both family models.
Deason and Gonzalez (2012) found a similar pattern when analyzing the
Presidential and Vice-Presidential convention speeches from the 2008 election. The
Democratic candidates Barack Obama and Joe Biden mainly drew from a nurturant
parent model, but the Republican candidates John McCain and Sarah Palin drew from
both a strict father and nurturant parent model. Deason and Gonzalez (2012) concluded
that issue frames, rather than underlying moral concepts, appeared to be the salient factor
that determined how candidates would discuss certain topics. For example, there was a
significant global recession occurring at the time which warranted language from the
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nurturant parent model regardless of political affiliation. It would not do to tell millions
of people that they needed to pull themselves out of financial trouble, as a strict father
moralist might; rather, candidates discussed how the government would care for citizens,
in line with nurturant parent morality.
As a measure of individual moral leanings, Feinberg et al. (2020) described the
process of developing the Moral Political Scale. This scale asks participants to rate their
agreement with various statements about a family, such as “I’d rather see my children
play cooperatively than competitively” or “Obedience must be instilled in children”
(Feinberg et al., 2020, p. 784), with the intent of discovering a person’s underlying family
concept (strict or nurturing). During development, the authors administered this scale to
participants from the Amazon Mechanical Turk website alongside other scales that
determined political leanings. Fienberg et al. (2020) found significant correlations
between strict parent scores and indicators of political conservatism, and likewise
between nurturant parent scores and indicators of liberalism. Their results supported
Lakoff’s (1996) model, and, importantly, it connected this model with a newer model for
morality in politics: Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt, 2013). Feinberg et al. (2020)
found significant correlations between nurturant parent morality and ideals that
emphasize care and fairness, as well as between strict father morality and ideals
emphasizing loyalty, authority, and purity. These five categories make up the five moral
foundations theorized by moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt and colleagues, a theory
which I will build on for the remainder of this study.
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Moral Foundations Theory
Haidt (2013) and Graham et al. (2013) described the process of constructing a
multidimensional theory of moral psychology by first reviewing past theories on morality
that rest on only one foundation. For example, they cited Lawrence Kohlberg’s
promotion of a moral imperative of justice, wherein actions are deemed moral or immoral
solely based on whether they promote justice, that is, whether good deeds are rewarded
and bad deeds are punished. Similarly, they reviewed Carol Gilligan’s work, which
argued that women view morality as based on whether actions promote care towards
others while preventing harm. These moral foundations are not unlike Lakoff’s strict and
nurturant models. Graham et al. (2013) argued that such monistic moral theories do not
capture the complexity of human moral intuition because they only provide one basis on
which humans judge something as moral or immoral—does an action promote justice or
not? Does it promote care or not? Graham et al. (2013) described themselves as
“unabashed pluralists” (p. 57), that is, their theory rests on the notion that humans have
several foundations on which to draw when making moral judgments.
Haidt and Joseph (2004) began constructing a multi-foundation model of moral
psychology by exploring possible evolutionary challenges of human physical and social
development. This became the Moral Foundations Theory, which is comprised of five
pillars of morality, each based on an evolutionary challenge of human history. Haidt and
Joseph (2004) argued that humanity needed to overcome these challenges to develop
within a complex social structure. The solutions to these challenges originated as social
goals common to members of a social group. Common goals became group values and
persist today as morals—underlying beliefs about what actions, attitudes, or behaviors are
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fundamentally right or wrong (Haidt, 2013). A brief description of these foundations
follows, adapted from Graham et al. (2013) and Haidt (2013):
1. The care/harm foundation, based on an evolutionary need to protect children.
Current manifestations include compassion for victims of harm, both human and
non-human (for example, compassion for nature or endangered species), as well
as anger at the perpetrators of this harm.
2. The fairness/cheating foundation, based on an evolutionary need to form
beneficial interpersonal relationships. Current manifestations include
interpersonal issues, such as relational fidelity, along with non-interpersonal
issues, such as equitable treatment towards all members of a society.
3. The loyalty/betrayal foundation, based on an evolutionary need to form social
groups. Current manifestations include group pride ranging from school alumni
and sports fans to political party and national pride.
4. The authority/subversion foundation, based on an evolutionary need to form
hierarchies within social groups. Current manifestations include respect and
obedience for those in authority in various contexts, such as teachers, bosses, or
political leaders.
5. The sanctity/degradation foundation, based on an evolutionary need to avoid
disease. Current manifestations include disgust at anything deemed a threat to
personal or group sanctity, such as sexual deviancy, immigration, or physical
maladies.
Graham et al. (2013) described the process of developing Moral Foundations
Theory as the co-development of theory and methodology. During the early stages of
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development, the theory informed researchers on methods to test the theory; these
methods then informed new directions and revisions for the theory, spurring new
methods and so forth. Moral Foundations Theory has primarily been tested in four
categories of methodology: word count analyses, self-report scales, implicit
measurements, and physiological measurements. I describe some of the studies here with
the exception of the word count analyses, to which I devote more attention in upcoming
sections.
Self-report scales
Graham and Haidt (2012) described the development and administration of a
Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale. This scale asked participants how much they would
need to be paid to commit a moral violation, such as burning the national flag to measure
loyalty or “kicking a dog in the head” (Graham & Haidt, 2012, p. 22) to measure care.
Participants could respond on a scale ranging from “I’d do it for free” to “not for any
amount of money” with a range of monetary values between these extremes from $10 to
one million dollars. Results showed that conservatives were less likely than liberals to
accept a monetary tradeoff for violations of the loyalty, authority, and sanctity
foundations. However, both liberals and conservatives were equally likely to refuse a
tradeoff for the care and fairness foundations.
Implicit Measures
In a “foundation tradeoff” task, Graham (2010) addressed the concern that moral
foundation research focuses on isolated moral content, whereas real world moral
judgments are often enmeshed in contexts that involve decisions between different
circumstances. After completing a questionnaire to determine political leanings,
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participants were asked a series of tradeoff questions to choose between the “morally
worse” of two different potential moral violations, for example “running a red light vs.
frowning at a stranger” (Graham, 2010, p. 23). Participants were assigned to either a
condition that encouraged quick gut-level reactions or a condition that encouraged slow
deliberation before making a choice. Across both conditions, those participants who
identified as liberal favored the care and fairness foundations; that is, when faced with a
tradeoff of moral violations, liberals consistently rated those which involved harm or
cheating as the worse violation. Conservatives rated violations of the loyalty, authority,
and sanctity foundations as worse when paired against care or fairness violations.
These results of the foundation tradeoff test are consistent with self-report
measures of moral foundation endorsement, although Graham (2010) acknowledged that
this test only begins to explore the possibility of implicit versus explicit judgment.
Graham (2010) expanded on this by performing affective priming tests, wherein
participants judged neutral words as positive or negative based on a particular priming
word. In one test, participants at a computer screen saw a “vice” word, that is, a word that
violates one of the five moral foundations, such as “kill.” This word flashed for 150
milliseconds on a computer screen, acting as a prime. Participants then rated a neutral
word as either positive or negative, with the assumption that a negative rating would
indicate that the participant reacted with stronger emotional valence after seeing the
prime word. Participants who identified as politically liberal rated the neutral words
paired with a ‘fairness’ vice as negative more often than conservative participants,
suggesting that liberals place greater emphasis on this foundation when making intuitive
moral judgments. Results across other foundations were similar to the foundation tradeoff
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task, with conservative participants placing greater emphasis on the loyalty, authority,
and sanctity foundations.
Physiological Measures
Cannon et al. (2011) measured facial micro expressions to explore the link
between emotions and morality. Participants were presented with various scenarios
representing violations of the five moral foundations, such as “someone cheated on a
game of cards” violating the fairness foundation or “someone gossiped about a friend”
(Cannon et al., 2011, p. 327) violating the loyalty foundation. Participants were asked to
give an appraisal of the scenario on a seven-point scale ranging from very negative to
very positive. Unbeknownst to the participants, researchers also recorded their facial
expressions during the study, with these facial expressions indicating affective responses
of disgust, anger, or unspecified positive affect. The researchers found a significant
correlation between affective response and moral appraisal, such that the strongest
affective responses were associated with the lowest appraisal ratings (i.e., those rated as
most negative). Cannon et al. (2011) did not include political affiliation as part of their
analysis, but their results do support the assertion of a multi-foundation model of
morality.
Moral Foundations and Politics
Graham et al. (2013) pointed out that Moral Foundations Theory was not initially
developed as a theory of political morality, but throughout development researchers
consistently noted that a partisan divide appeared to exist within the five foundations. For
example, Graham et al. (2009) found that study participants who completed the moral
foundations questionnaire and identified as politically liberal more often endorsed moral
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issues based in the care and fairness foundation, while conservative participants endorsed
moral issues based in loyalty, authority, and sanctity. Haidt (2013) suggested that this
divide is due, at least in part, to the individuating aspects of the first two foundations
compared to the conforming aspects of the remaining three. The care and fairness
foundations focus on individuals as moral agents, which may correspond to progressive
political philosophies that place emphasis on individual liberties. This is opposed to the
loyalty, authority, and sanctity foundations, which focus on groups as the moral agents
and may correspond to conservative philosophies that emphasize group conformity.
To explore the political divide of Moral Foundations Theory, Feinberg and Willer
(2015) measured participant reactions to various political arguments framed by language
that would align the argument with either typically liberal moral foundations or typically
conservative ones. In one example, they framed an argument for universal health care in
terms of basic human rights (appealing to the care and fairness foundations) or in terms
of physical health and purity (appealing to the sanctity foundation). Similar questions
were used based on English as a national language or the legality of same-sex marriage.
Across their tests, the authors found that participants were more likely to support an issue
based on the moral framing of that issue, rather than the issue itself. If the issues were
framed in a way that appealed to typically conservative moral foundations, conservative
participants were more likely to claim that they supported the issue, and likewise for
liberal participants.
Participants were then prompted to write arguments for policy issues with the
explicit goal of persuading someone of opposing political affiliations (Feinberg & Willer,
2015). Participants consistently wrote these arguments in a way that appealed to their
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own moral foundations, rather than the anticipated foundations of their audience. Taken
alongside the authors’ initial findings that the moral framing of a message impacts
acceptance more than the message itself, the participants’ written arguments would likely
be ineffective in persuading their intended audience. In addition, this suggests that people
are generally unaware of the moral divide between parties and how their own moral
reasoning may bias attempts at communicating across this divide.
It appears then, that American politics is couched in moral reasoning. If a
politician attempts to persuade his or her audience with morally charged language, it is
possible that they will only succeed in persuading those who already align with the moral
convictions referenced, as suggested by Feinberg and Willer (2015). This could be one
factor as to why the 2020 presidential election was so evenly divided, perhaps because
the two primary candidates failed to reframe their messages for those with differing
moral foundations. Moral Foundations Theory provides one lens through which to
examine moral content of political messages. The theory suggests that the candidates’
language should reference their moral positions in predictable ways according to political
party. Biden’s language should reference the individuating moral foundations of care and
fairness more often than Trump’s language. Similarly, Trump’s language should
reference the conforming foundations of loyalty, authority, and sanctity more often than
Biden’s language. Thus, I propose five hypotheses to test while analyzing the content of
each candidate’s campaign speeches:
H1: Biden’s speeches will contain greater moral content from the care foundation
than Trump’s speeches.
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H2: Biden’s speeches will contain greater moral content from the fairness
foundation than Trump’s speeches.
H3: Trump’s speeches will contain greater moral content from the loyalty
foundation than Biden’s speeches.
H4: Trump’s speeches will contain greater moral content from the authority
foundation than Biden’s speeches.
H5: Trump’s speeches will contain greater moral content from the sanctity
foundation than Biden’s speeches.
One way to test these hypotheses is to use a keyword analysis based on a moral
foundations reference word list. This type of analysis yields scores for each text analyzed
indicating the moral content found under each of the five moral foundations. Further
statistical analysis can identify if the mean scores of each category differ between
candidates at a statistically significant level. To date, three Moral Foundations
Dictionaries have been developed. The first two came out of research by some of the
originators of Moral Foundations Theory, while a third was developed independently. I
describe the process for each below.
Defining and Measuring Moral Content
The Moral Foundations Dictionary
Graham et al. (2009) outlined the first attempts to use word count analysis to
identify the moral content of a text. The authors began by developing a reference list of
words for each moral foundation under the assumption that a speaker’s use of certain
words would reveal his or her underlying moral conceptualizations. The resulting word
list was dubbed the Moral Foundations Dictionary (MFD). Initial development of this
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dictionary involved a group that included the authors and five research assistants. This
group began with the base words for each foundation (i.e., care, harm, fairness, cheating,
etc) and then used dictionaries and thesauruses to find synonyms and other words related
to these bases. This led to a large list of possible keywords for each moral foundation.
The authors then reduced the list of words to eliminate those that did not seem directly
relevant to the corresponding foundation as well as words that carried multiple meanings
not related to morality (e.g. ‘just’ means ‘fair’ but also ‘only’). The resulting Moral
Foundations Dictionary used by Graham et al. (2009) contains 295 total words and wordstems (e.g. “kill*” as a root for ‘killer,’ ‘killing,’ ‘killed,’ etc.) across the five moral
foundations.
To test the validity of the moral foundations dictionary, Graham et al. (2009) used
a corpus of religious sermons based on the assumption that these would naturally contain
a high level of moral content and that this content would fall along predictable lines of
liberal versus conservative content based on the religious source. Graham et al. (2009)
reviewed research that correlated political leanings and political involvement with
various Christian denominations. This led them to conclude that Southern Baptists
sermons and Unitarian Universalist sermons should give clear examples of conservative
and liberal moral content, respectively. In line with the broader Moral Foundations
Theory, Graham et al. (2009) hypothesized that the Southern Baptist sermons would
contain more words from the loyalty, authority, and sanctity foundations, while the
Unitarian Universalist sermons would contain more words from the care and fairness
foundations.
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To test their hypotheses, Graham et al. (2009) used the Linguistic Inquiry and
Word Count (LIWC) computer program. This program uses a reference dictionary (in
this case, the moral foundations dictionary) to analyze a set of text files. It returns scores
for each text file from each category defined in the reference dictionary. This score
indicates moral keyword density, measured as the percentage of total words in the
analyzed text file that are present in each moral foundation. For example, a keyword
density of .11 in the “care” category of a 1,000-word file would indicate that .11% of
those 1,000 words (or eleven words total) matched an entry for “care” in the reference
dictionary.
The basic assumption of this form of analysis is that words that appear in one
moral foundation with greater frequency than others may indicate that the author or
speaker of the analyzed text is endorsing that foundation over the others. Graham et al.’s
(2009) initial results mostly supported their hypotheses, with the liberal sermons
containing greater moral content from the care and fairness foundations when compared
to the conservative sermons, while the conservative sermons contained greater moral
content from the authority and sanctity foundations compared to the liberal. However, the
comparison for the loyalty foundation was not in the direction predicted; words appeared
here more frequently in the liberal sermons.
Graham et al. (2009) considered the likelihood that context may have played an
important role in this difference. While a computer can tally words based on a list of
reference moral foundational words, it cannot determine how the word is being used in
context. For example, the word may be used to either support or deny the category, it
may be used ironically or as part of a quote. Instances such as these could negate the
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validity of the analysis. To correct for this possibility, Graham et al. (2009) included a
post-hoc contextual analysis of the sermons, wherein human coders used the output of the
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count analysis to validate or adjust the initial results. The
authors took a sample of the words highlighted along with two or three sentences of
surrounding context to create clusters of keywords plus context. After scrambling these
clusters and removing information that would indicate their source texts, four respondents
scored each cluster on whether the moral keyword appeared to support or deny the
assigned moral category, or indeed whether it appeared to be neutral overall. After this
adjustment took place, the results for the loyalty foundation reversed. The coders found
that the liberal sermons most often used words from this foundation to criticize, rather
than support, loyalty-based morality. The contextual analysis did not reverse results for
any other moral foundations, thus lending overall support to the validity of the word
count analysis with the caveat that further analysis may be beneficial in interpreting the
results.
The reliance on human-based contextual analysis to correct automated data
represents a potential limitation of automated word-count analysis, that this automation
may not be able to reveal the whole story of moral content in an analyzed corpus. This is
particularly problematic for Moral Foundations Theory because it describes morality as
an inherently intuitive process. The moral foundations dictionary was developed by a
small group of researchers who deliberated over which words should be included in the
dictionary. Such deliberation may be at odds with the underlying concept of morality
being an intuitive, rather than deliberate, process. Since Graham et al.’s (2009) initial
work, researchers have sought to address this limitation with two variants of the moral
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foundations dictionary: the Moral Foundations Dictionary 2.0 (Frimer et al., 2017) and
the extended Moral Foundations Dictionary (Hopp et al., 2020). Both were developed
with the goal of moving beyond a small list of deliberately chosen words, though each
took a different path to this end. I describe the two processes below, beginning with the
Moral Foundations Dictionary 2.0.
The Moral Foundations Dictionary 2.0
Frimer et al. (2017) reviewed Graham et al. (2009) and commented on two
primary limitations of the Moral Foundations Dictionary, the relatively short list of words
in the dictionary and the lack of certain words that appear to be prototypical of each
domain (such as ‘murder’ or ‘torture’ in the care/harm foundation). To address this,
Frimer et al. (2017) first generated a large list of words for each moral foundation in a
manner not unlike the initial “deliberation by experts” described by Graham et al. (2009).
However, to move beyond this deliberative process, Frimer et al. (2017) analyzed this
new list of words using the Word2Vec computer program to validate which words were
highly prototypical of each moral foundation 1. Word2Vec returned a vector score for
each word in the new word list that indicated how likely each word would be found
alongside other foundational words in natural language. From these scores, Frimer et al.
(2017) selected those above a statistically significant threshold, resulting in a total word
list of 2,103 words, nearly ten times as many as the initial Moral Foundations Dictionary.

1

Word2Vec, developed by Google, uses artificial intelligence to analyze an input text and compare it to a
large database of reference corpora that is meant to capture natural language use. Word2Vec assigns
numerical scores to words in the reference corpus based on how often they appear in context with words in
the input text. Words with high scores indicate a higher likelihood that they are used alongside a reference
word. Thus, each input word receives a “vector” score of related words.
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The second step in creating the Moral Foundations Dictionary 2.0 was to test the
validity of the new dictionary alongside the initial dictionary developed by Graham et al.
(2009). Frimer et al. (2017) recruited participants from a crowdsourcing website, 656 of
which completed an essay writing task. After reading information about a randomly
chosen moral foundation, each participant was instructed to write about a time in which
someone acted either in accordance with or against that foundation. This created a corpus
of natural language texts which Frimer et al. (2017) analyzed in the Linguistic Inquiry
and Word Count program with their new moral foundations dictionary. By analyzing a
text that was specifically written about someone exhibiting care, for example, the authors
explored whether their new moral dictionary would detect moral content in that category
at a higher rate than the previous dictionary. This proved to be the case, with higher
keyword density scores and higher effect sizes across all categories when compared to
the Moral Foundations Dictionary.
Both the Moral Foundations Dictionary and the Moral Foundations Dictionary 2.0
used word lists that reflect an implicit operationalization of the moral content of a textual
corpus. Specifically, morality in a text is based on language as it is appears to be used,
built from lists based on the assumptions of word usage to reveal underlying moral
thought. The measurement of this language in terms of keyword density is an attempt to
describe the moral content of a text in terms of the author’s use of certain words and, by
possible extension, the intent of the author to convey a particular moral message. Thus,
the focus appears to be on the author of a text, despite the fact that an author’s intent to
communicate a particular moral message may not be the same message that an audience
interprets. Researchers in the Media Neuroscience Lab at the University of California,
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Santa Barbara developed a new method for measuring moral content that addresses this
angle, as well as other potential shortcomings of Frimer et al.’s (2017) method.
The extended Moral Foundations Dictionary
Whereas the first Moral Foundations Dictionary (Graham et al., 2009) relied on a
small group of people with subjective interpretations of which words would likely fall
into each moral category, the updated version 2.0 is built on mathematical models of
natural language use to increase construct validity, followed by an analysis of participant
written texts to test this validity. However, Hopp et al., (2020) noted that the Moral
Foundations Dictionary 2.0 is still primarily based on expert deliberation. The
mathematical modelling performed by the Word2Vec program used a deliberative set of
seed words to begin with, and so the resulting dictionary may still be constrained in its
ability to reflect the intuitive process of moral interpretation. Hopp et al. (2020)
addressed this by creating a new moral dictionary, the extended Moral Foundations
Dictionary. It is still based on Moral Foundations Theory but developed from the ground
up in a process different from the first two iterations.
The extended Moral Foundations Dictionary (Hopp et al., 2020) takes a
crowdsourced approach to dictionary construction. Rather than assuming a list of words
and testing whether they fit into a specific category, the extended Moral Foundations
Dictionary was built with a greater dependence on a priori human input, essentially frontloading the dictionary with participant-rated interpretations of moral keywords. This was
done via a crowd-sourced annotation task, wherein 557 participants from across the
United States read 20 articles each from a sample of 2,995 newspaper articles. These
participants produced 63,958 annotations, indicating words and phrases that they felt
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represented an appeal to any or all of the five foundations described by Moral
Foundations Theory. From these annotations, Hopp et al. (2020) applied various filtering
and data cleaning tasks to extract a final quantity of 3,270 words from these annotations,
each of which was assigned a score from 0 to 1 for each of the five moral foundations.
These scores represent the number of times a participant annotated that word for a moral
foundation divided by the total number of times the word was seen by any participant.
In addition to developing and implementing the methods to build a new moral
foundations dictionary, Hopp et al. (2020) developed a companion computer program to
perform analyses with their dictionary. The program, eMFDScore, is available as open
source software from the lead author’s GitHub repository (Hopp et al., 2019/2021).
eMFDScore is similar to LIWC2015 in that it can analyze a corpus based on a given
reference list, although a researcher is limited to using either the first two Moral
Foundations Dictionaries or the new extended Moral Foundations Dictionary.
Theoretically then, it is possible to compare analyses using different dictionaries within
one program, and Hopp et al. (2020) did just that. There do seem to be some limitations
in these comparisons, but before addressing these it is important to consider what is being
measured when using the extended Moral Foundations Dictionary and how the results are
to be interpreted.
The foundation scores returned by eMFDScore when using the extended Moral
Foundations Dictionary indicate “the probability that a particular word was annotated
with a particular moral foundation” (Hopp et al., 2020, p. 237). The authors describe the
computation of these scores as the number of times a participant associated a word with a
particular foundation divided by the number of total participants that saw that particular
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instance of the word. The resulting statistic indicates the proportion of annotations that
associated a word with each of the foundations. However, there does not appear to be
anything probabilistic about this. Scores based on the extended Moral Foundations
Dictionary are based on a past event that can be measured with certainty, that is, the
annotation procedure that had definite, measurable outcomes.
The discussion of “probability” versus “proportion” may just be an issue of
semantics, and it is not my intent to argue against the exact verbiage used. However, this
verbiage reflects a potentially problematic conceptual basis for the measure. If the
statistics returned by eMFDScore are indeed probabilities, this seems to indicate that they
may be used as inferential statistics, rather than the strictly descriptive style of a LIWC
analysis, for example. Yet this raises the question of what exactly a researcher can infer
with these probabilities? If a document receives a “mean probability” score of .15 for the
care foundation, does this mean that there is a 15% chance that any given member of the
public will interpret a message related to care? Is it simply a 15% chance that another
round of the same annotation procedure would interpret a message related to care?
The best that Hopp et al. (2020) have to offer is an explanation that their scoring
system reflects a proportion of interpretation from their initial participant pool, yet they
do not specify precisely what this statistic might mean when applied to the analysis of
any given set of texts. If their participant pool is meant to reflect the interpretation of the
general public, the authors do not justify what makes their pool representative of a wider
population. Haidt (2013) described in depth how the moral foundations appear to be
consistent across cultural bounds. It is thus difficult to accept that a relatively small
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sample of participants based in the United States would form an adequately
representative pool that can reliably predict the moral intuitions of humanity at large.
Comparing the Methods
Hopp et al. (2020) discussed the superiority of the extended Moral Foundations
Dictionary compared to the Moral Foundations Dictionary and Moral Foundations
Dictionary 2.0. The authors analyzed the same corpus with all three dictionaries to
demonstrate that the extended Moral Foundations Dictionary returned higher scores
overall for each moral foundation and that these scores were more normally distributed
than the previous two dictionaries. Further, they showed that significant positive
correlations existed between scores for the same moral foundations across dictionary
types. Thus, they concluded that the extended Moral Foundations Dictionary presents a
better understanding of the moral content of a text, and that the correlations between
dictionaries show that the methods were detecting the same “moral signal” (Hopp et al.,
2020, p. 240).
However, there appear to be some major limitations to this comparison. While
Hopp et al. (2020) used the Moral Foundations Dictionary and Moral Foundations
Dictionary 2.0 in their original forms, they did not score their target documents in the
same way that previous research on these dictionaries has done (e.g. Graham et al. 2009,
Frimer et al. 2017, Frimer 2019). The eMFDScore program can use the Moral
Foundations Dictionary and Moral Foundations Dictionary 2.0 dictionaries, but it scores
items by computing the proportion of total moral keywords identified that exist within
each foundation. For example, if an item contains 100 total words found anywhere in the
Moral Foundations Dictionary with 24 in the care foundation specifically, eMFDScore
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returns a score of .24 for the care foundation. This is regardless of the overall wordcount
of the item, which previous methods used to calculate keyword density of a text. Further,
when using eMFDScore to analyze a corpus with the extended Moral Foundations
Dictionary itself, the scoring again changes. Rather than calculating each moral
foundation as a proportion of total moral content, eMFDScore returns an average of the
scores assigned to words in the extended Moral Foundations Dictionary. It is unclear then
how these scores can be directly compared or why, for instance, “higher scores” using the
extended Moral Foundations Dictionary indicate anything substantial about its superiority
over other dictionaries.
Summary
The first two iterations of the Moral Foundations Dictionary were based on
deliberation about what words would likely indicate an appeal to a given moral
foundation. This inherently creates dictionaries that describe morality based on words as
they are used, or as they are presumed to be used. The validation test by Frimer et al.
(2017) took this one step further by analyzing documents to determine how a participant
pool used words in relation to morality. However, the extended Moral Foundations
Dictionary was created based on how a participant pool interpreted words in relation to
morality. Thus, the first methods define moral content based on the presumed intended
use of language, while the more recent method defines it based on the apparent
interpretation of language.
In addition to inherent differences surrounding the definition of moral content,
there are distinct differences in the quantification of moral content depending on the
analysis program used. Assuming all methods are adequately reliable and valid, it may be
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possible for a researcher to use more than one method to triangulate his or her
understanding of the morality of a text. Aside from this, a direct one-to-one comparison
of methods to determine the superiority of one over all does not seem warranted; the
methods simply do not measure the same concept in the same way.
It is not my intent to dismiss the work of Hopp et al. (2020). Indeed, they gave a
compelling rationale for creating a crowd-sourced dictionary with a continuous scoring
scheme across moral foundations. Human morality is nuanced and context specific, and
their method may reflect this more accurately than the discrete, binary counting method
provided by a LIWC analysis. Therefore, it seems natural to conclude that the extended
Moral Foundations Dictionary offers greater inferential power than previous method.
However, without additional tests to solidify the validity and reliability of the method in
different contexts, any insight derived from an eMFDScore analysis should not be
accepted as generalizable to a broad audience. Because Hopp et al. (2020) did not make a
clear argument as to what their analysis results truly indicate, I tested my hypotheses with
a LIWC2015 analysis using the Moral Foundations Dictionary 2.0. That said, I was still
interested in how an eMFDScore analysis would compare, and so I performed this
analysis as well.
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Experiment 1
Method
Sample
I used a purposive sampling strategy to include all instances of public speaking,
such as speeches, debates, and town halls, given by the Presidential candidates between
August 17, 2020 (the first day of the Democratic National Convention) and November 4,
2020 (Election Day). This sample contains 131 events in total, of which 56 involve Joe
Biden and 75 involve Donald Trump. I have chosen this specific period of the election
season because it involves direct campaigns between two candidates of opposing political
parties. Events earlier in the season may have included campaigning against others within
the same party, for example during the primary elections. While it would be interesting to
explore differences in moral content within the same party, that is beyond the scope of
the proposed research.
I obtained full transcripts of the selected events from the website Rev.com, which
uses software to create automated transcriptions of a wide variety of sources. The website
offers free transcripts of political speeches as a public service. Users can watch a speech
on Rev.com while following along with the transcription, thus allowing a quality check
of passages that appear unclear or incorrectly transcribed. I used this function along with
Microsoft Word’s “Find and Replace” feature to edit out unclear or extraneous
information, such as words from other speakers, speaker identification markers,
timestamps, and so on. Thus, I ended with 131 text files containing nothing more than
each speakers’ words.
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Biden’s sample (N=56) ranged in word count from 408 words to 10,587 words
(M=3,457.45, SD=1,725.36), while Trump’s sample (N=75) ranged in word count from
1,138 words to 18,303 words (M=9,292.25, SD=3,930.14). This reveals a difference in
mean word count of nearly 6,000 words, and a t-test shows that this difference is
statistically significant, with t(129)=10.380, p<.001. This difference makes some sense
when comparing the contexts of each speakers’ events. Most of Trump’s speeches were
delivered at large rallies, during which Trump was known to speak extemporaneously
about various topics. In contrast, Biden’s events were smaller in scale, and he may have
been more likely to follow a close script.
These discrepancies cannot be ignored when running a word count analysis.
However, using overall word proportions rather than raw word counts allows for an
easier comparison between situations with drastically different word counts. If a speaker
consistently draws from a particular moral foundation, then there would presumably be
the same proportion of these moral keywords despite the speaker’s overall word count.
This assumption underlies many of the studies that led to the development of Linguistic
Inquiry and Word Count itself (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010) as well as the first two
iterations of the Moral Foundations Dictionary (Graham et al., 2009; Frimer et al., 2017;
Frimer, 2019).
Design
This first analysis tested the moral content of my sample to detect differences
predicted by Moral Foundations Theory. The independent variable was the speaker,
either Biden or Trump. The unit of analysis was an individual speech, analyzed as a
single text file per speech. The dependent variables were the measure of moral content
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for each moral foundation, operationalized here as the density of moral keywords present
in each speech, that is, the proportion of individual speech word count that falls under
each moral foundation.
Procedure
I used the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count computer program (version
LIWC2015) alongside the Moral Foundations Dictionary 2.0 (Frimer et al., 2017). I
separately analyzed the sample of Biden’s speeches and the sample of Trump’s speeches
to obtain scores for the five moral foundations. These scores reflect the proportion of
overall words in the analyzed speech that fall under each category. For example, a speech
of 100 words that contains five words in the care foundation would receive a score of
5.00 for that foundation. While the Moral Foundations Dictionary 2.0 allows separate
analysis for “virtue” and “vice” words for each category, I combined these for overall
category analysis. My hypotheses do not directly address instances of “virtue” versus
“vice” words, and the combination of these counts to reflect a total foundation score is in
line with previous studies using the moral dictionaries (e.g., Frimer, 2019; Graham et al.,
2009; Hopp et al., 2020). Thus, the LIWC2015 program returned overall word count for
each item, total keyword density across all moral foundations, and total keyword density
for each foundation individually. I loaded this data into IBM SPSS version 28 for an
ANOVA of the five categories to test my hypotheses at the significance level of p<.05.
Results
Figure 1 shows a boxplot of each candidate’s moral content based on mean moral
keyword density per speech. Based on this boxplot and initial descriptive statistics (see
table 1), it appeared that Biden’s mean scores are higher across all five moral foundations
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than Trump’s scores. Before proceeding with the ANOVA to test these differences, I first
checked the skewness of each category. A common critique of word count analyses is
that the results are often highly skewed (e.g., Frimer, 2019; Hopp et al., 2020). With the
slight exception of Biden’s “fairness” foundation that showed a skewness statistic of 2.28
(see table 1), my analysis appeared to be fairly regular overall. Frimer (2019) applied a
logarithmic transformation to his MFD analyses to correct for skewness, but this did not
appear to be advantageous in my case.
Figure 1
Boxplot Depicting Moral Keyword Analysis Using LIWC2015 and the Moral
Foundations Dictionary 2.0.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of LIWC2015 Analysis Using the Moral Foundations Dictionary
2.0.
Bidena
Min
Max
M
SD
Skew
Trumpb
Min
Max
M
SD
Skew
a

Care

Fairness

Loyalty

Authority

Sanctity

.17
2.73
.99
.47
1.11

.00
1.56
.35
.26
2.28

.25
2.21
1.19
.43
.19

.00
2.14
1.04
.41
.32

.20
1.40
.62
.25
1.16

.05
1.21
.64
.22
-.13

.00
.84
.24
.13
1.84

.08
1.59
.79
.23
-.24

.26
1.35
.72
.19
.79

.00
.79
.44
.15
-.39

n = 56. bn = 75.

Table 2
Means, Standard Deviations, and One-Way Analysis of Variance of Moral Content Using
LIWC2015 and the Moral Foundations Dictionary 2.0.
Moral Foundation
Care
Fairness
Loyalty
Authority
Sanctity
***
p < .001.

Biden
M
.99
.35
1.19
1.04
.62

Trump
SD
.47
.26
.43
.41
.25

M
.64
.24
.79
.72
.44

F(1, 129)
SD
.22
.13
.23
.19
.15

32.15***
11.36***
47.20***
35.73***
27.50***

Results of the ANOVA are shown in table 2. Across all five moral foundations,
there is a statistically significant difference between Biden’s and Trump’s moral content
as measured by moral keyword density, or the proportion of overall word count found in
each moral foundation. Regarding the care foundation, Biden’s moral content (M=.99,
SD=.47) was significantly higher than Trump’s moral content (M=.64, SD=.22), F(1,
129)=32.15, p<.001; this supports H1.
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Regarding the fairness foundation, Biden’s moral content (M=.35, SD=.26) was
significantly higher than Trump’s moral content (M=.24, SD=.13), F(1, 129)=11.36,
p<.001; this supports H2.
Regarding the loyalty foundation, Biden’s moral content (M=1.19, SD=.43) was
significantly higher than Trump’s moral content (M=.79, SD=.23), F(1, 129)=47.20,
p<.001. While this result is significant, the direction of difference between candidates is
counter to my prediction in H3.
Regarding the authority foundation, Biden’s moral content (M=1.04, SD=.41) was
significantly higher than Trump’s moral content (M=.72, SD=.19), F(1, 129)=35.73,
p<.001. While this result is significant, the direction of difference between candidates is
counter to my prediction in H4.
Regarding the sanctity foundation, Biden’s moral content (M=.62, SD=.25) was
significantly higher than Trump’s moral content (M=.44, SD=.15), F(1, 129)=27.50,
p<.001. While this result is significant, the direction of difference between candidates is
counter to my prediction in H5.
Within-Subject Comparisons
While performing the above analysis, I observed that the overall pattern of moral
content per foundation appeared to be similar for each candidate. That is, each candidate
appeared to emphasize words from the loyalty foundation, followed by the authority
foundation, the care foundation, and the sanctity foundation, with the least amount of
emphasis on the fairness foundation. To test whether the differences between categories
are significant, I ran pairwise t-tests within each candidate’s corpus. I began with the
loyalty foundation as the category with the highest mean scores for both candidates,
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compared with the authority foundation with the second highest mean scores. Subsequent
pairs followed this ranking pattern. Results are displayed in table 3.
Table 3
Within-Subject Comparisons Using LIWC2015 and the Moral Foundations Dictionary
2.0.

M

SD

Biden
t(55)

Pair 1
Loyalty
1.19
.43
2.12
Authority
1.04
.41
Pair 2
Authority
1.04
.41
.75
Care
.99
.48
Pair 3
Care
.99
.48
6.57
Sanctity
.63
.25
Pair 4
Sanctity
.63
.25
6.25
Fairness
.35
.26
Note. All p values reflect two-tailed t-tests.

Trump
p

M

SD

t(74)

p

.038

.79
.72

.23
.19

2.54

.013

.458

.72
.64

.19
.22

3.19

.002

<.001

.64
.44

.22
.15

9.57

<.001

<.001

.44
.24

.15
.13

7.90

<.001

Discussion
Initial analysis of the moral content of my sample using LIWC2015 and the Moral
Foundations Dictionary 2.0 provided mixed support for my hypotheses. Biden’s moral
content as measured by keyword density surpassed Trump’s content for all moral
foundations, not just those predicted by Moral Foundations Theory. Using this measure
alone, one could find support for the observation that Biden’s goal was to be a ‘values
candidate’ who emphasized a return to morality in contrast to the previous
administration. Such a candidate may very well use a higher instance of morally salient
language overall. However, results also revealed similar patterns of moral keyword use
between the candidates. Except for a statistically non-significant difference between
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Biden’s mean keyword usage for ‘authority’ and ‘care,’ both candidates essentially
emphasized the same moral foundations within their speeches.
Analysis reveals statistically significant differences when comparing means
between candidates. However, given their apparent similarities in moral orientation, or
the pattern of moral foundation emphasis, there may be no real substantive differences
between them. It may simply be the case that Trump gave longer speeches with more
neutral content, but when it comes down to moral language, perhaps both candidates
were more similar than they were different. This reveals a potential stumbling block
when using a keyword counting analysis such as the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
program. A researcher could draw very different conclusions depending on both how a
study operationalizes the underlying concept of interest and whether tests are carried out
between or within subjects.
It is worth considering the overall word count per foundation of the Moral
Foundations Dictionary 2.0 when evaluating these results. Perhaps the scores for
‘fairness’ and ‘sanctity’ were low because the reference list was simply smaller than the
other foundations? This does not appear to be the case. The Moral Foundations
Dictionary 2.0 contains an average of 421 combined virtue and vice words for each moral
foundation. The foundation with the smallest number of words is loyalty with only 192
words, yet both candidate’s highest mean scores were in this category. The fairness
foundation contains 351; still below average, but seemingly not enough to warrant scores
significantly lower than the remaining foundations. Interestingly, the sanctity foundation
contains the highest word count at 660, yet this foundation ranked second to last in the
analysis.
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Experiment 2
Method
I wanted to know how these results compared to an analysis using the extended
Moral Foundations Dictionary while avoiding Hopp et al.’s (2020) apparent gap in
comparing these methods. If I were to run an analysis using the eMFDScore program, it
would not provide a direct comparison to my initial results given the inherent differences
in score calculation and overall operationalization. I needed to take a few preliminary
steps before performing the eMFDScore analysis: reformatting the corpus for use with
eMFDScore and performing an eMFDScore analysis using the Moral Foundations
Dictionary 2.0. I describe these processes below.
Testing a Segmented Corpus
First, I adjusted the corpus to reflect the requirements for eMFDScore, which vary
from LIWC2015. EMFDScore requires a corpus to be compiled into a single spreadsheet
document with every item entered into a single cell. I created one spreadsheet for each
candidate in Microsoft Excel, but I encountered a software limitation in the process. A
single cell in Excel is limited to 32 kilobytes of information, or roughly 6,000 words.
This was not a problem for most of Biden’s speeches, in which only two items exceeded
this limit and required me to split the item over two cells. However, I was required to
split many of Trump’s speeches into two or three cells. This meant that, rather than
analyzing 131 total items, I would now be analyzing 211 total items. See table 4 for
descriptive statistics of the reformatted corpus.
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics of LIWC2015 Analysis Using the Moral Foundations Dictionary
2.0 with Segmented Corpus.
Bidena
Min
Max
M
SD
Skew
Trumpb
Min
Max
M
SD
Skew
a

Care

Fairness

Loyalty

Authority

Sanctity

.17
2.73
.97
.48
1.04

.00
1.56
.36
.27
2.06

.25
2.21
1.16
.45
.12

.00
2.14
1.02
.41
.31

.00
1.40
.60
.27
.87

.05
1.83
.72
.33
.92

.00
.84
.23
.14
1.72

.08
4.18
.93
.52
3.38

.00
1.47
.73
.23
.29

.00
1.82
.49
.22
1.89

n = 59. bn = 152.

Biden’s sample (N=59) ranged in word count from 408 words to 6,118 words
(M=3,281.64, SD=1,262.03), while Trump’s sample (N=152) ranged in word count from
223 words to 6,258 words (M=4,639.83, SD=1,848.22). This revealed a much smaller
difference in mean word count than the initial analysis, though a t-test showed that this
difference is still statistically significant, with t(209)=5.19, p<.001.The new corpus not
only has a different sample size, but essentially a different unit of analysis, moving from
‘entire speech’ to simply a speech segment in the case of larger speeches. It is possible
that this change alone could lead to differences in analysis. If so, then I would have less
confidence in comparing the analyses between LIWC2015 and eMFDScore, since there
would be fundamental differences in the corpus.
Given that only two of Biden’s speeches needed to be split for reformatting, his
moral foundation statistics did not change much. However, Trump’s statistics are more
skewed, particularly within the loyalty foundation. This is perhaps due to certain
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segments of Trump’s speeches containing a higher density of loyalty content that
essentially became “diluted” when examining the speeches as a whole. Though given that
Trump’s overall moral content is not significantly skewed, I did not apply any
adjustments before running the ANOVA.
I analyzed this new corpus with LIWC2015 as in Experiment 1 under the
assumption that similar results would lend confidence in a comparison between the two
methods. Results of this ANOVA were in line with my initial analysis of the unmodified
corpus of speeches; see table 5 for full results. Biden’s speeches (and speech segments)
still contained a higher mean moral keyword density than Trump’s, though results were
slightly less statistically significant for the loyalty foundation (changed from p<.001 to
p=.003) and the sanctity foundation (changed from p<.001 to p=.001). These were still
under my significance threshold of p<.05, and so the overall results stand: H1 and H2
continued to be supported, while H3, H4, and H5 again found statistically significant
difference in the opposite direction predicted. I believe this was a necessary first step in
comparing analysis methods; if differences arise between the two, it does not appear that
a difference in corpus structure would be at fault.
Table 5
Means, Standard Deviations, and One-Way Analysis of Variance of Moral Content Using
LIWC2015 and the Moral Foundations Dictionary 2.0 with Segmented Corpus.
Moral Foundation
Care
Fairness
Loyalty
Authority
Sanctity

Biden
M
.97
.36
1.16
1.02
.60

Trump
SD
.48
.27
.45
.41
.27

M
.72
.23
.93
.73
.49

SD
.33
.14
.52
.23
.22

F(1, 209)

p

19.57
19.42
9.04
43.01
10.88

<.001
<.001
.003
<.001
.001
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After completing this intermediate step, I analyzed the segmented corpus with
eMFDScore using the Moral Foundations Dictionary 2.0 as the reference dictionary.
While eMFDScore will not return absolute word counts as LIWC2015 does, it should
depict a pattern of moral content that can be compared to the pairwise analysis performed
above. If these agree, it again increases confidence in a comparison between methods. I
describe this process in detail below.
Sample
For this analysis, I used the segmented corpus as described above.
Design
This analysis tested the moral content of the segmented corpus described above in
a manner similar to experiment 1. The difference here lies in how the scores were
calculated for each moral foundation. Rather than reporting keyword density,
eMFDScore reports the number of words per moral foundation divided by the total
number of words identified across all foundations. This gives relative scores per moral
foundation without regard to overall word count. The purpose of this step is to compare
results to the candidates’ moral orientation patterns as observed in experiment 1.
Procedure
I used the eMFDScore program to analyze the segmented corpus using the Moral
Foundations Dictionary 2.0 as a reference. I combined virtue/vice scores into a single
score per category before loading the data into IBM SPSS 28 for ANOVA comparisons.
Results
Rather than the keyword density scores that LIWC2015 provided, eMFDScore
showed the keyword use per category divided by total moral keywords found. See figure
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2 for a boxplot of this analysis, along with tables 6 and 7 for descriptive statistics and
ANOVA results. The ANOVA indicated that the mean relative proportions of moral
content from each foundation did not vary between candidates at a statistically significant
level.
Figure 2
Boxplot Depicting Moral Keyword Analysis Using eMFDScore and the Moral
Foundations Dictionary 2.0.
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics of eMFDScore Analysis Using the Moral Foundations Dictionary
2.0 with Segmented Corpus.
Bidena
Min
Max
M
SD
Skew
Trumpb
Min
Max
M
SD
Skew
a

Care

Fairness

Loyalty

Authority

Sanctity

.07
.49
.24
.08
.67

.00
.44
.09
.07
2.86

.12
.69
.26
.09
2.26

.00
.38
.26
.08
-.77

.00
.50
.16
.07
2.53

.05
.41
.23
.06
-.17

.000
.43
.08
.06
2.94

.05
.56
.28
.07
.49

.00
.67
.25
.07
.89

.00
.44
.16
.06
.86

n = 59. bn = 152.

Table 7
Means, Standard Deviations, and One-Way Analysis of Variance of Moral Content Using
eMFDScore and the Moral Foundations Dictionary 2.0 with Segmented Corpus.
Moral Foundation
Care
Fairness
Loyalty
Authority
Sanctity

Biden
M
.24
.09
.26
.26
.16

Trump
SD
.08
.07
.09
.08
.07

M
.23
.08
.28
.25
.16

SD
.06
.06
.07
.07
.06

F(1, 209)

p

.25
.56
1.62
.59
.49

.615
.454
.204
.445
.487

Discussion
These results did not support my hypotheses, but it is worth noting that this is due
to a different operationalization of the moral content analysis. What was more
noteworthy about these results is that they supported an observation from the first
analysis using LIWC2015; while Biden used a higher keyword density across all moral
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foundations, the overall pattern of moral content does not significantly vary between the
two candidates.
By performing these intermediate analyses, I have addressed a gap left by Hopp et
al. (2020) in comparing their method with previous methods. Using the LIWC2015
program alongside the Moral Foundations Dictionary 2.0, I have shown that the analysis
of my sample did not significantly vary between an unmodified corpus versus a
segmented corpus arranged for use with the eMFDScore program. Further, I
demonstrated that the measurement, and thus operationalization, of moral content was
fundamentally different between a LIWC2015 analysis and an eMFDScore analysis when
using the same reference dictionary. While the eMFDScore analysis did confirm a pattern
observed in the LIWC2015 analysis, the two sets of results lead to different conclusions
when testing my hypotheses. With these results in mind, I turn now to an analysis using
the eMFDScore program with the extended Moral Foundations Dictionary as a reference.
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Experiment 3
Method
Sample
For this analysis, I used the segmented corpus described in experiment 2.
Design
For my final analysis, the independent variable was again the speaker, either
Biden or Trump. The unit of analysis was an individual speech or speech segment,
analyzed as a segment of text with 6,000 words or less. The dependent variables were the
measure of moral content for each moral foundation, operationalized here as the mean
eMFD annotation score of all identified words in each segment.
Procedure
I used the eMFDScore program to analyze the segmented corpus with the
extended Moral Foundations Dictionary as the reference word list. I configured
eMFDScore to return total probabilities across all moral foundations in order to capture
the continuous moral weighting scores for which Hopp et al. (2020) advocated.
eMFDScore also returns “sentiment” scores for each foundation, but since I combined
virtue/vice scores in the previous analyses, I had no direct comparison for the sentiment
scores. I loaded the moral foundation scores into IBM SPSS 28 for ANOVA
comparisons.
Results
When using eMFDScore with the Moral Foundations Dictionary 2.0, I obtained
scores that indicated keywords per moral foundation divided by total keyword use.
However, the scores using the extended Moral Foundations Dictionary are calculated
differently. Words in this dictionary are assigned multiple scores per foundation, with
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each score indicating the proportion of initial participants that assigned a word to a
particular foundation. For each corpus segment analyzed, the total word scores are added
and then averaged within each foundation. A boxplot depicting these mean scores per
foundation is shown in figure 3.
Figure 3
Boxplot Depicting Moral Keyword Analysis Using eMFDScore and the extended Moral

Mean Proportion
Scores

Foundations Dictionary.

My initial observation of the data is that both candidates again appeared to exhibit
the same pattern of moral content, but this pattern is very different from the one depicted
by the previous analyses using the Moral Foundations Dictionary 2.0. See table 8 for
descriptive statistics of these results, and table 9 for the ANOVA results.
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Table 8
Descriptive Statistics of eMFDScore Analysis Using the extended Moral Foundations
Dictionary with Segmented Corpus.
Bidena
M
SD
Skew
Trumpb
M
SD
Skew
a

Care

Fairness

Loyalty

Authority

Sanctity

.11
.006
-.11

.11
.004
-.11

.10
.003
.30

.09
.004
1.38

.09
.004
.58

.11
.005
-.03

.10
.004
.82

.10
.005
1.83

.09
.005
.85

.09
.003
.22

n = 59. bn = 152.

Table 9
Means, Standard Deviations, and One-Way Analysis of Variance of Moral Content Using
eMFDScore and the extended Moral Foundations Dictionary with Segmented Corpus.
Moral Foundation
Care
Fairness
Loyalty
Authority
Sanctity

Biden
M
.11
.11
.10
.09
.09

Trump
SD
.006
.004
.003
.004
.004

M
.11
.10
.10
.09
.09

SD
.005
.004
.005
.005
.003

F(1, 209)

p

.11
39.79
3.10
.25
10.18

.741
<.001
.080
.616
.002

Regarding the care foundation, Biden’s moral content (M=.109, SD=.006) was not
significantly different from Trump’s moral content (M=.109, SD=.005), F(1, 209)=.110,
p=.741; this did not support H1, thus it contradicted findings of my first analysis.
Regarding the fairness foundation, Biden’s moral content (M=.106, SD=.004) was
significantly higher than Trump’s moral content (M=.102, SD=.004), F(1, 209)=39.789,
p<.001; this supported H2 and was in line with the findings of my first analysis.
Regarding the loyalty foundation, Biden’s moral content (M=.099, SD=.003) was
lower than Trump’s moral content (M=.100, SD=.005), F(1, 209)=3.104, p=.08. This
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result approached the significance level of p=.05, but it did not fully support H3, nor was
it in line with the initial analysis.
Regarding the authority foundation, Biden’s moral content (M=.094, SD=.004)
was not significantly different from Trump’s moral content (M=.094, SD=.005), F(1,
209)=.252, p=.616. This did not support H4, nor was it in line with the initial analysis.
Regarding the sanctity foundation, Biden’s moral content (M=.086, SD=.004) was
significantly lower than Trump’s moral content (M=.087, SD=.003), F(1, 209)=10.184,
p=.002. This supports H5, though this result contradicted the initial findings of the MFD
2.0 analysis.
To further explore these results, I ran another set of within subject comparisons
(shown in table 10), as the boxplot appears to show a similar pattern of moral content use
for each candidate, with the highest mean probability scores in the care foundation and
descending scores for each subsequent foundation. Pairwise t-tests confirm this pattern,
with both candidates showing statistically significant differences at the level p<.001 for
each step down the line.
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Table 10
Within-Subject Comparisons Using eMFDScore and the extended Moral Foundations
Dictionary.

M
Pair 1
Care
.11
Fairness
.11
Pair 2
Fairness
.11
Loyalty
.10
Pair 3
Loyalty
.10
Authority
.09
Pair 4
Authority
.09
Sanctity
.09
***
p < .001 (two-tailed).

Biden
SD

t(58)

M

Trump
SD

.006
.004

4.70***

.11
.10

.005
.004

22.83***

.004
.003

12.94***

.10
.10

.004
.005

6.95***

.003
.004

12.26***

.10
.09

.005
.005

32.04***

.004
.004

16.11***

.09
.09

.005
.003

20.86***

t(151)

Correlations Between Dictionaries
As one final comparison of the Moral Foundations Dictionary 2.0 and the
extended Moral Foundations dictionary, I ran a correlation analysis between the results
obtained by both dictionaries using the eMFDScore program. Hopp et al. (2020)
performed the same test and noted significant positive correlations between the two
different scores reported for each of the five moral foundations. Thus, they concluded
that both dictionaries reliably measure the same content, with their extended Moral
Foundations Dictionary providing a more valid measure of that content. However, the
scores obtained for my sample do not support the same correlations.
Using the scores obtained from the Moral Foundations Dictionary 2.0 and the
extended Moral Foundations Dictionary, both as assessed by the eMFDScore program, I
found a statistically significant positive correlation between scores in the care foundation,
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r(209)=.49, p<.001; the loyalty foundation, r(209)=.42, p<.001; and the sanctity
foundation, r(209)=.15, p=.033. However, I found a non-significant correlation between
scores in the fairness foundation, r(209)=-.05, p=.435, and a statistically significant
negative correlation between scores in the authority foundation, r(209)=-.22, p=.001.
Discussion
This round of analysis revealed a different picture overall than any of the analyses
using the Moral Foundations Dictionary 2.0. Here, both candidates appear to have
emphasized the ‘care’ and ‘fairness’ foundations over the rest, which seems to reflect a
liberal model of morality as described by Moral Foundations Theory. As with the first
analyses, these results showed nearly identical patterns of moral foundation content
between the two candidates. While two categories, ‘fairness’ and ‘sanctity,’ did contain
statistically significant differences in alignment with my hypotheses, these differences are
on quite a small scale. It is unclear then what substantive difference may truly exist
between the two candidates under this analysis.
It is interesting that the two dictionaries did not significantly correlate across all
five moral foundations as Hopp et al. (2020) found. My sample contained no significant
correlation between the measure of fairness between the two dictionaries, thus I can only
conclude that the two candidates used words that the extended Moral Foundations
Dictionary coded under ‘fairness’ that were not included in the same category in the
Moral Foundations Dictionary 2.0. The presence of a negative correlation for the
‘authority’ is perhaps even more striking, possibly indicating opposing bases for how the
concept of authority appears in the corpus.
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General Discussion
Theoretical Implications
When using an automated analysis to extract keywords from a text, it is inevitable
that a researcher will confront the question of meaning. Is it truly possible to understand
the moral meaning behind a text using these results? The underlying assumption of the
LIWC2015 analysis is that yes, it is possible to gain some degree of understanding about
the author or speaker’s moral content. Frimer (2019) briefly describes the history of
analyzing words to uncover the thoughts and intentions of the speaker of those words, a
history also recounted in Tausczik and Pennebaker’s (2010) description of how they
developed Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count. However, Tausczik and Pennebaker
(2010) offered a strong caveat about what their methods can and cannot accomplish,
acknowledging that LIWC strips the meaning from words due to imprecise measurement
and a lack of context (p. 30).
It seems almost necessary then to couple any attempt at an automated word count
analysis with a qualitative study to determine the validity of the moral foundations
highlighted by the analysis and arrive at a real understanding of the underlying meaning
of this analysis. For example, does Biden’s average moral keyword density of 1.19% in
the loyalty foundation correspond to any particular message about loyalty, or is a
researcher simply meant to brush aside this question and accept that this quantity of
words is sufficient to reveal an underlying psychological inclination towards loyalty? The
latter almost appears to be the case, as Tausczik and Pennebaker’s (2010) caveats do not
appear to be present in much of the research using LIWC and the Moral Foundations
Dictionaries.
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The results from experiment 3 show a pattern of morality for each candidate with
statistically significant differences between various foundations, both within and between
candidates. Yet the scores themselves fall within a very tight range, from .09 to .11, all
with tight standard deviations of .003 to .006. These scores give a particularly tenuous
foundation on which to draw substantive conclusions about the candidates’ moral stances.
They appear to point towards a conclusion that an audience might interpret a higher
emphasis on the ‘care’ foundation, but only by a matter of two percentage points over the
lowest foundation of ‘sanctity.’ Does this truly indicate anything substantial about the
moral content in the corpus?
Practical Implications
Social Context
Where all methods converge in my study is the result that both candidates used
quite similar patterns of language related to the five moral foundations. While I began
this study with a general question about the possibly polarized nature of Biden’s and
Trump’s moral stances, there now appears to be little partisan difference between them as
would be predicted by the relevant theory. I return to the research by Cienki (2005) and
Deason and Gonzalez (2012). While these studies viewed morality through Lakoff’s
(1996) models, they did find similar evidence that presidential candidates do not fall
neatly in line with the model. Deason and Gonzalez (2012) specifically point out the
relevance of social context and dominant issue frames that may dictate, to some extent,
the language that candidates will use to discuss an issue. This could very well be the case
with the current study, and a full contextual analysis could warrant future research.
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Briefly though, it is worth considering some of the societal context of the 2020 election
and how this might have affected language use by the candidates.
On March 13, 2020, President Trump declared a national state of emergency
concerning COVID-19, a newly emerged coronavirus pandemic. This virus upended
social life and is yet to be fully contained as of this writing, a year and a half after
Trump’s declaration. Several issues relating to the virus became political touchstones,
such as whether the government had the right to mandate that all citizens wear protective
face masks, limit indoor gatherings, or receive vaccinations. This could very well have
created an issue culture surrounding the topics of authority, loyalty, and even care, thus
dictating certain ways of discussing these topics on the national stage. As the pandemic
hit nations worldwide, so did issues of social and racial justice in response to the death of
George Floyd, as previously mentioned. Many public entities, such as entertainment
companies and even food brands, came to terms with elements of their business that
perpetuated inequality in some form. This could have affected the way that people
discussed fairness in the public sphere.
Intent and Interpretation of Moral Messages
It is common practice for politicians to hire professional speech writers,
particularly when campaigning for office. These speeches are written deliberately and for
a specific purpose. Perhaps then it is no wonder that both Biden and Trump appeared to
have such similar moral orientations, as this may just reflect the language deliberately
chosen to appeal to a wide audience. This may be part of the reason that Graham et al.
(2009) felt that political speeches would be ineffective in validating the Moral
Foundations Dictionary, and for a validation study they would appear to be correct.
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However, the two methods of moral analysis presented here seem quite appropriate to
study speeches when considering the two concepts of deliberate language use and
audience appeal. After all, the Moral Foundations Dictionary 2.0 is inherently built upon
the assumed and observed frequency of words pertaining to morality, while the extended
Moral Foundations Dictionary is inherently built upon the interpretation of words
pertaining to morality.
Both methods could be useful then, for such instances as deliberate speech
writing. Before the speech is delivered, there would be an opportunity to analyze the
speech with the Moral Foundations Dictionary 2.0 and validate that the intended moral
messages were present. This could be followed by an extended Moral Foundations
Dictionary to determine if an audience may be likely to interpret the message in the same
way it was intended. This concept may underlie the differences between the results in my
study, particularly for content in the ‘fairness’ foundation. These differences could point
to a disconnect between the message that was intended and the message that might be
interpreted.
In the current digital age, researchers have access to untold amounts of data,
including transcribed speeches from practically every major politician in recent memory.
It is tempting to assume that a simple, automated analysis would be able to reveal the
content of a source text, neatly quantified and categorized into different categories of
meaning. It is precisely this meaning, however, that gets lost when keywords are
decontextualized. This is especially true of text that originated as speech, wherein the
actual words spoken make up only a part of the intended and interpreted meanings
involved.
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Limitations and Conclusions
There are at least three potential limitations to this study. First, I tested two
individual speakers against a generalized model of moral language use. Perhaps, then, it
should not be surprising that neither of them fit their predicted model. Graham et al.
(2009) noted that they specifically avoided analysis of political speeches because of the
assumption that the moral content would be scripted and altered to appeal to the voting
public, rather than being indicative of the speaker’s actual moral foundations. My results
perhaps confirm this assumption, but future research could take a deeper look at this to
determine the extent to which moral content analysis can reveal anything useful in
political campaign speeches. It would also be useful to increase the number of speakers
analyzed from each party, perhaps using a corpus of campaign speeches over time. Using
a greater number of speakers across different social contexts could be a better test of the
claims of Moral Foundations Theory. As it stands, my results should not be taken as a
direct refutation of the underlying theory just because the patterns predicted by the theory
did not hold true.
Second, my tests used their respective analysis methods at their most basic level.
For example, I used combined moral foundation scores when using LIWC2015 rather
than separately analyzing each candidate’s vice/virtue split. Similarly, I did not use the
moral sentiment ratings returned by eMFDScore, nor did I delve into advanced features
of eMFDScore such as syntactic parsing which highlights moral agents and targets of a
speech. It is possible that a more detailed look at the full array of possible data would
yield yet another perspective on the moral patterns in my sample. However, it is also
possible that this level of detail would obscure the picture even further. It would be useful
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for future research to clearly quantify the differences between all available analysis
methods, in their original and modified forms, to understand if one method is truly
superior.
Finally, I did not include any form of qualitative analysis that might reveal a
broader contextual understanding of the moral language of either candidate. Admittedly,
this is a potential limitation of any automated keyword analysis. Computer programs that
add up instances of words cannot identify what those words mean in context. However,
the ability of computers is always advancing, and the syntactic parsing ability of
eMFDScore (Hopp et al, 2020) is one possible step towards bridging the gap between
computer and human analysis. As this and similar methods arise, it is essential that the
developers of these methods demonstrate sound validity and reliability of their measures
and a logical operationalization of the concepts under analysis.
This study presented several perspectives on the moral content of Biden’s and
Trump’s campaign speeches during the 2020 US Presidential Election. Using two
different reference word lists, it appeared that neither candidate used moral content in
patterns predicted by Moral Foundations Theory. It does appear that Biden’s speeches
contained on overall higher density of moral content than Trump’s, in line with his claim
to be the morally grounded option of the two. More interestingly though, the patterns of
moral content were very similar between both candidates, perhaps because of overarching
public issues that dictated certain moral stances. This study adds to the research by
identifying gaps in the comparison of two methods for moral content analysis, as well as
identifying how both methods may be used to present a more detailed perspective of this
analysis.
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